
1500KStreet
NW #330 Washington, D.C. 20005
This deficit has resulted in the need for foreign governments to implement incentives or other policy signals to encourage hydropower development. Foreign policymakers are becoming much more open about soliciting advice on how to attract private investment. U.S. investors that continue to be active in these markets feel this is a positive sign, and that overall, hydropower investment holds the promise of a profitable future.
Despite cutting edge
technology, repowering of existing plants, and innovative plant efficiency
practiced by U.S. private developers, the rapidly developing independent power
producer sector is dominated by thermal generation. This outcome is not a
consequence of any inherent defect of hydropower but, rather, stems from
structural problems in new and emerging energy markets that inadvertently
discount the advantages of hydropower and highlight its disadvantages.
Uncertain criteria and timelines. Private developers seeking multilateral
financing (funding from a donor country to a developing country, via a lending
institution such as the World Bank) and bilateral financing (essentially
funding between two countries with an emphasis on trade and development) for
hydropower projects have encountered significant uncertainty in the process.
For example, the soft costs involved in providing the exhaustive studies
required for hydropower projects are ten times the average for other generation
projects. These can include lengthy and expensive environmental studies and
mitigation, such as are often required by the World Bank.
But contrary to stereotype, environmental
barriers, while significant, are not the largest hurdle hydropower developers
have to jump over. Companies are required practically to bushwhack their way
through an internally inconsistent and uncertain permitting process. To
complicate matters further, many countries continue to restructure their
markets during this years-long process, meaning that requirements and
conditions can change midway through.
There also are no specific timeframes by
which to review a project. Based on recent U.S. industry case studies in
several markets, developers are facing timelines—from initial financing efforts
to completed construction and commissioning—of two to three times the
anticipated lengths. The 672-mw Birecik
dam, the first privatized hydro project in Turkey, took 9 years to reach
financial closure. The smaller 36-mw
Bhote Koshi project in Nepal took 3 ˝ years to reach financial closure, and 5
years to reach completion.
Disparity in debt repayment terms. With global movement toward
more competitive electricity markets, hydropower must compete on a short-term
price basis with other technologies. While hydropower has the advantage of
having mostly fixed costs over a project’s operating life, it faces the
disadvantage of having higher initial development costs than thermal
alternatives—some 100 to 200 percent higher, depending on the site—due both to
higher construction costs per unit of capacity and higher interest as a result
of longer construction periods. (See Table 1.) The result is that hydropower
does not enjoy long-term financing and instead is forced to compete on 7- to
10-year financing. (Nuclear projects, for example, enjoy 15-year debt
financing.)
This financing problem has
been addressed in some cases by using very complicated debt structure that
includes World Bank guarantees for foreign currency debt during the last few
years of an extended loan repayment period. But simpler structures with lower
transaction costs are needed.
Debt repayment terms of 15 to
20 years beyond the date of commercial operation would make most hydropower
plants competitive in the early years of operation. Longer debt terms reduce
the political and financial problems that result when power sales tariffs are
front-loaded with high rates during the debt repayment period and much lower
rates after the debt is retired. With longer term financing, many sound hydro
projects can compete, over a useful life of 50 years or more, with any
alternative technology. Plus, hydropower projects have far less operating risk,
and will almost always have very low operating costs which are little affected
by inflation, volatile and uncertain future fuel prices, or other external
changes—unlike thermal alternatives. Longer repayment terms are justified given
the long useful lives of hydropower projects and their minimal operation and
maintenance expenses.
Lack of financing support for high front-end costs. At the local level,
hydropower projects face the burden of securing financing for upfront capital
costs, including civil works, which can amount to 40-70 percent of the total
project. These costs are not generally eligible for Export Credit Agency (eca)-supported financing. eca is responsible for arranging for the export of services and
manufactured goods; in this case, from the U.S. utility to the host country. Another international organization, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd), helps fund local costs up to 15
percent of the total, leaving a large chunk of financing on these projects
unaccounted for. And local development banks and capital markets—with a few
exceptions such as China and Malaysia—can’t supply long-term local currency
financing for large expenditures like hydropower projects, either because they
traditionally have not done so or they simply are unable to.
Bidding costs and abuses. Preparing bids for developing hydropower
projects is extremely expensive, easily costing more than a million dollars for
each developer. To prepare the bid, a developer must estimate output by
evaluating hydrology (water availability) and efficiencies; determine project
costs (land acquisition; construction costs including access roads,
transmission lines, project civil works, and mechanical and electrical
equipment; operation and maintenance cost; and financing costs); determine a
permitting and approval plan; prepare a detailed project implementation
schedule; and arrange preliminary financing. There is never enough detail or
assurances of the accuracy of project fundamentals provided in the bidding
package to allow inexpensive bid preparation.
Furthermore, the developer
and his team are given little flexibility to improve on a proposed project. The
utility often cites the need to make competing proposals easier to compare, or
to use its standards since it will own the project after the concession
expires. However, these attitudes are seriously counterproductive—and squarely
at odds with the goal of producing competitively priced power.
Sidebar
To learn more or get involved,
contact Debby Stone, U.S. Hydropower’s director of trade promotion, at
202/383-2536 or by e-mail: debbys@us-hydropower.org.
You can also visit the website at www.us-hydropower.org.
Figure 1
Worldwide Hydropower Situation in 1998—Undeveloped
Potential
Total: Approximately 1.5 million to 2 million megawatts
Percent
China – 21
Asia – 26
Africa – 17
South America – 25
North America – 6
Europe – 5
Source: Hydro Review Worldwide
Table 1
Thermal vs. Hydro—Factors Affecting Bankability
|
Factor |
Thermal |
Hydro |
|
Capital cost ($/kilowatt) |
400-1,400 |
800-3,000 |
|
Operating cost |
high |
low |
|
Construction risk |
low |
high |
|
Construction time |
2-4 years |
3-6 years |
|
Project life |
15-20 years |
>50 years |
|
Decommissioning costs |
yes |
unlikely |
|
Electrical and mechanical plant |
80 percent |
30 percent |
|
Site influence |
low |
high |
|
Technology |
changing |
mature |
Source: Private Financing of Hydro Projects by
C.R. Head, PSWG, Croatia 1997.